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T HE Agrarian Reform is the cornerstone of the new Cuba which isbeing brought into existence by the zéth of July movement led by
Fidel .Castro. In spite of the long struggle against Batista and the
sensational publicity offered by a sympathetic press before January,
1959, the underlying principles of the revolutionary movement were
not well known either inside or outside Cuba.' However, once in power
the early pronouncement of an agrarian reforrn program served to
identify the Cuban Revolution as no mere explosive_changing of the
palace guard by bullets rather than ballots, so typical of sorne of
the more unstable Latin American governments, but as one of the few
profound social revolutions to occur in a Latin American nation.
The primarily agrarian countries of Central and South America
have long been clasped in the vise of latifundia. Thís system of land
tenure, with antecedents in the encomiendasand mercedes reales granted
to the early conquerors and colonizers,prevented a well balanced social
and economic development. The wars of independence served in
many cases (although not in Haiti) to establish more firmly the mo.
nopoly of fertile land in the hands of a few ímportant creole families,
With the comming the twentieth century the problem was compounded
by the formation of powerful corporations which undertook the ex-
plotation of vast territories, particularly in the tropical Caribbean
countries.
The history of the nineteenth century offers few examples of a
successful agrarian reform movement in Latin America. In Argentina
the law of emphyteusis (1822.26) drawn up by Bernardino Rivada-
vía is seen by sorne as an effort to prevent latifundia by retaining
state ownership of the vast pampa land which was rented out to the
settler. However, othershave pointed out that while the principie
may have been worthy, in practice the settlers were never bothered
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by the state pressing the c1aim of ownership, and the result was an
even more drastic land monopoly than would have been perhaps pos-
sible if the land had been secured by outright purchase from the
state. In Mexico the law (1856) drafted by Miguel Lerdo de Tejada
was truly a land reform law in the sense that it atternpted to redis-
tribute land already in private or institucional non.government hands.
However, it was primarily directed at the extensive holdings of the
Roman Catholic Church, and it apparently benefited the wealthy, who
were the only ones able to buy the confiscated land. Furthermore, it
is c1aimed that the Indian ejidos were adversely affected by the law.
Latin América did not experience a successful land reform until
the ultimate realization of the slowly defined objectives of the Mex-
ican Revolution. Although fifty years have passed since Porfirio Díaz
feU, the constructive phase of the revolution is too recent to permit
a conc1usive evaluation of this social upheaval. Recently, however,
strong doubts have been expressed as to the positive economic effects
of the land redistribution. As Frank Tannenbaum has observed:
The agrarian movement is a success politicaI1y and sociaI1y, even if its
economic by-produots leave much to be desired. After all, there are
millions of Mexicans who feel that they own the land they till, and have
something to defend that is their own. And if anything is certain, it is
that no one will: tak~ their lands away from them again.!
Previous to the Revolution 9070 of the rural population had no land,
but by 1940 4070 of the total population had land to cultivate.
FoUowing the Mexican example, other countries from Puerto
Rico ,to Chile -in answer to movements of social protest nurtured by
the great depression- began to look for w ays to break the age.old
monopoly oí land. Sorne efforts were too radical, too quickly drawn
up, or too superficial to have a lasting effect. In Guatemala, singled
out as one of the countries most oppressed by latifundia in a United
Natíons survey of 1951, the Arbenz regime rapidly put into effect
in 1952 a sweeping agrarian law. Before defeated by the conniving
of the Dulles brothers, the leftist government expropriated 392,95°.43
uncultivated or unimproved acresof the United Fruit Company
which had held twice as much land as the total held by about 5070
of the small independent Guatemalan farmers." EventuaUy however,
Guatemala will have a lasting agrarian reform, for even those ene-
1 Frank Tannenbaum, "Reflections 00 the Mexican Revolution", [ournal 01 Inter-
natlonal Affairs, Vol. IX, No. 1 (1955), p. 43.
12 Guillermo Torriello, La Batalla de Guatemala (México: 1955), pp. 38-39.
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mies ofthe October, 1944 revolution admit that drastic revision of
the semi-feudal land system is long overdue."
In Chile, the agrarian reform is moving far too slowly to satisfy
the inquilino or roto. Sorne 626 holders in the central valley, with an
average of 57,182 acres per fundo, control over 5210 of the fercíle
land of the country. The government has been negligent in enforcing
the law which restricts entail and gives the state preferential option
to buy any central valley land placed on the open market. To balance
off this representative survey of Latín American agrarian reforms, two
countries leasr in need of such reform might be mentioned. In land
glutted Brazil, Fernando Ferrari, federal representative from the state
of Río Grande do Sul and leader of the Brazilian Labor Party, points
to the suffocating political control of the large cane, cattle, cacao,
or coffee [ezendeiros, and urges an immediate agrarian reform law
which would restore social dignity to the landless.' In Costa Rica,
long recognized as an economically successful nation of small farmers
yet never mentioned by those who fear agradan reforms as a move
to "Haitianize" the land economy, the Instituto de Tierras y Colonias
of the Figueres government undertook the settling of 15,000 families
on unoccupied land." Most of these landless weré rural squatters who
had little effect on the agricultural production of the nation. Land,
machinery, education, and orientation were the remedies which the go.
vernment proposed to apply.
As the great revolution of the twentieth century slowly touches
one by one the predominantly agricukural nations of Central and
South América, it is to be expected that the struggle for social justice
will be dominantly characterized not by the organization of strong
labor syndicates or the fight for higher wages and better working
conditions but by the breaking up of feudal land monopolies, the
wresting of both uncultivated and cultivated fie1ds from their owners,
and the forceful distribution of potential wealth in land among those
who have served in suffering silence. Or stated as Christian doctrine,
paraphrasing the Rerum Novarum of Leo XIII, God granted man
the earth not to be exploited selfishly in any way he pleased but
with the recognition that private property was to be put to good use
and controlled by the laws of the community.
Each country has defined its agrarian reform in its own terms, and
3 Mario Efraín Nájera Farfán, Los B,rtafadores de la Democracia (Buenos Aires:
1956), p. 156.
4 Fernando Ferrari, "La reforma agraria en Brasil", Combate (March-April, 1959),
pp. 68-75.
¡; José Figueres, Cartas a un ciudadano (San José: 1956), p. 126,
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the method to carry it out, if it is to achieve success, must bepeculiarly
designed by each comrnunity. Thus the ejido in Mexico, the reset-
tlement of squatters in Costa Rica, or the plans for a small farmers'
bill of rights in Brazil are diverse examples of what is generally termo
ed an agrarian reformo
2
"Latifundism was the economic basis of feudalism andit has often
reproduced this state. The struggle of the modern age has always been,
particularly since the eighteenth century, to give man freedom and
sever him from his bondage to the land, and for the freedom of the
land, liberating it from the monopolistic tyranny of mano Today this
process is on the way to being repeated in the Antilles, and one day
we shall see agrarian laws enacted to disentail the lands he1d in the
grasp of mortmain"."
Almost twenty years after writing the aboye prophecy Fernando
Ortiz, the great Caribbean intellectual now seventy.eight, ls observing
the first serious steps to deal with the latifundia in his native island
of Cuba. When recentl y needled by one of the outspoken journalists
(Agustín Tamargo, who has also provoked the ire of Fidel Castro),
Ortiz gentIy· reminded the young revolutionaries that an agrarian
reform is not something completely new to Cuba.' Very broadly
defined, . any change of control over che land resources can perhaps
be conceived as an agrarian reformo
Cuba' s first large agricultural enterprises developed in the cattle
industry. The physical layout of the large cattle ranches (hatos)
has .left a unique mark on the face of the island which time and re"
forms have not been able to remove completely. Any observer flying
over the flat interior of the island soon notices the sections of long
curved ares forrned by trees or fences which seem to mark the bound-
aries between one farm and another. These unique hatos were laid
out, usually with a water sources as the center of radius, by the cato
tle ranchers who carne with the first Spanish colonizers of Cuba. In
1536 the first hatos were formally recognized by the cabildo of Santi
Espíritu, which acted without royal consent. Other cabildos copied
this illegal and unprecedented measure.
So common did the practice become that in 1574 an official
of the crown, Judge Alonso de Cáceres, sanctioned the process, al-
though insisting that the granting of smaller private property be pero
6 Fernando Ortiz, Cuban Connterpoint: Tobacco and Suga}' (New York: 1947),
p. 52.
7. Bohemia, August 23, 1959.
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rnitted and regulated. The large cartwheel ranches meanwhile were
slowly converted into communal estates as the population grew and
found no adequate means of dividing the land among the .members
of successive generations. The result was a very conEused superimposi.
tion of communalisrn upon prívate property."
In the fertile parts of the interior, cattle raising has long since
given way to the cultivation of the soil and the production of mar.
ketable crops. However, in the less fertile and drier sections of Cuba,
large cattle ranches still exist, indicating that latifundias are not lim.
ited to the sugar estates." Over 298,000 caballerías (in Cuba a ca-
ballería equals about 33-1/3 acres), or 42.9'ro of Cuban soil, make
up sorne 90,000 cattle ranches, of which 200 are latifundias. While
the statistics are far from complete, an idea of the concentration may
be grasped when it is realized that 2'ro oE these farms account for
42-4ro of the nation's cattle according to the 1952 cattle census." The
largest cattle ranches -some, like the King ranch, of over 1,000 ca.
ballerías- are found in the two eastern provinces of Oriente and
Camagüey. -
In the seventeenth century, with the conversion of the cattle
estates into communal haciendas and the subsequent tilling of the soil
and developrnent of prívate holdings, tobacco became the important
cropalong with other subsistence products typical oE the small farm.
While sugar had been grown since the settling of Cuba, .there was
not enough capital at this time to allow large scale production. The
Spanish mercantile system prevented the introduction of slave labor
and access to sugar markets, In the latter half of the eighteenth cen-
tury, the occupation of Havana by the English in 1762 and the Haitian
insurrection were two decisive events which markedly stimulated the
sugar production of Cuba. The one, in the word of Ramiro Guerra,
"swamped" Cuba with African slaves.P and the otherproduced an
immediate and almost insatiable European market. In 1775 there were
453 mills producing 1,300,000 arrobas. The Otaheitian strain of cane
which required planting only once every seven years was íntroduced
in 1795, and twenty five years later the steam engine was incorporated
into the industrial phase of sugar production. The cooperative hand
8 This picture is studied in ~ brief but excellent article by the Cuban economist
Julio Le Riverend: "Los orígenes de la propiedad agraria en Cuba," La Revolución,
July 26, 1959. See also Ramiro Guerra y Sánchez, Historia de Cuba, Vol. II, p. 182.
9 Large coffee haciendas are found in the province of Oriente. There, sorne 3,836
caballerías are split upamong 7,071 farms. See Francisco Pérez de la Riva, El café
(La Habana: 1944), p. 267. . .
:1Q Osear Pino Santos, "Monopolios y terratenientes", La Reuolucián, May 18,
1959.
n Ramiro Guerra y Sánchez, Azrtcar y población en las Antillas (La Habana:
1944), p. 54.
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of an able economist in the person of Alejandro Ramírez (well re-
membered in Puerto Rico) cut through legal red tape and, accord.
ing to Antonio Bachiller y Morales," changed the face of Cuba by
liberalizing the use of private property. By 1827 there were over a
thousand milIs, producing 8,000,000 arrobas, and more being added
yearly. Almost in alarm the respected agricultural economist Ramón
de la Sagra was calling for diversification of agricultural production,
which, among other things, was included in his program of "La gran
reforma de la agricultura cubana.'?" In 1840 the Frenchman Derosne
introduced a new refining process which doubled the amount of sugar
taken from the cane.14 By 1857, 20,000 caballerías were divided
among 1,570 cane-consuming sugar mills. Some of the largest ingenios
were El Progreso with 184 caballerías but only 39 in cane; San Rafael
with 57 of íts 180 caballerías in cane; and Alava with 65 of its 148
caballerías in cane." Ramiro Guerra y Sánchez, citing the historian
Pezue1a, indicates that in 1860 the number of ingenios reached its
maximum of 2,000. One claimed to have 340 caballerías and
another 222.
From this point on Cuban sugar production takes a different turno
The number of ingenios begins to decline, and emphasis on efficient
and mechanical production forces the employment of large capital
reserves. Those independent enterprises of an individual or family
nature with limited resources are forced to close down at least the
processing stage of sugar production. Cuba is torn by ten years of
civil war and slavery is abolished. The railroad, used since 1836 to
bring the cane and firewood to the mills, now branches out, transporto
ing cane from areas where local ingenios can no longer satisfy the de.
mand for good quality sugar. The cane grower now becomes a colono
of the servicing central.
By 1877 the number of centrals had been reduced to 1,190 but
by the end of the century and after a destructive war for independ.
ence there were only 207 centrals functioning in Cuba. In 1894-5
Cuba produced a million tons of sugar, but by 1897 production had
dropped to 300,000 tons and did not rise until the turn of the century
and the rapid infiltration of United States capital. Some of the cor,
porations first on the scene were the Cubap American Sugar Company,
1'2 Antonio Bachiller y Morales, Prontuario de Agricul: ..ra General para el ¡ISO
de los labradores, hacendados estudiantes de la Isla ck Cuba (Habana: 1882), p. 4.
13 Ramón de la Sagra, Anales de Agricultura e Industria Rural, Año 4, Núm. 5
(May, 1831), p. 258.
14 M. Derosne y Cail, De la elaboracián del azúcar en las colonias y de los nue-
vos apartIJos destinadas a mejorarla (Habana: 1844), p. 23.
15 Los Ingenios-Colección dJe Vistas de los principales ingenios de az¡/car de la
Isla de Cuba (Habana: 1857).
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the West Indian Sugar Sales Corporation, and the United Fruit, which
had incredible luck in picking up 3,713 caballerías on the north coast
of the Oriente province for $100. At the time of the first World War
Cuba suffered the second wave of foreign sugar corporations, indud-
ing the Cuban Atlantic Sugar Company and the American Sugar Re.
fining Company. By 1958 Cuba had 161 centrals. With the establish-
ing of complete vertical control of the sugar process the production
figures have been multiplied many times.
In 1958, the sugar companies in Cuba owned or controlled
184,400 caballerías of land which is about 27'% of the total amount
of agricultural land on the island. Sorne twenty-eight of the largest
firrns control 83'ro of the land dedicated to sugar, or 153,000 caballe-
rías. The top six firms, with thirty-six centrals, domínate just about
ha1f-77,200 caballerías of this 83ro.16 Of the top eleven corpora-
tions eight are North American with close to 85,000 caballerías and
three are Cuban with over 30,000 caballerías." Stockholders of the
United Fruit Company and the West Indian Sugar Company could
walk from the north to the south coast of Cuba in one of the eastern
provinces without stepping off their own property.
In summation of the statistical picture, 4,423 .farms or 2.81% of
the total number contain 385,000 caballerías, or 56.9'ro of the total
area of Cuba. The figures and statistics have changed but slightly
since Ramiro Guerra y Sánchez wrote in 1927:
Perhaps more than 40% of the total area of Cuba is dominated by
latifundia. Within that enormous portion of his homeland, the Cuban
farmer cannot foster the most profound and lively aspiration of the man
who has a family and wants to look after its future destiny: to own a
pieoe of land that is his own in order to raise a house and cultivate,
as a free worker, the land in which he was born.>"
3
"Sometimes the Cuban is
referred to ... as a happy Puerto Rican."19
The History of the Puerto Rican sugar industry runs parallel to
that of the Cubano The twentieth century saw the same invasion of
1.6 Pino Santos, loe. cit.
17 Jacinto Torras, "¿Cuánto han extraído de Cuba las 'Sugar Cornpanies'?", Hoy,
August 2, 1959.
18 Guerra y Sánchez, Azúcar y poblacián, op, cit., pp. 95-96.
19 Theodore Brameld, The Remaking 01 a Culture (New York: 1959), p. 199.
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American capital-by 1930 sorne 120 million dollars- and the same
monopolistic control over scarce fertile land. Instead of eight large
corporations as in Cuba, there were four, operating sorne eleven cen.
trals in 1930 and accounting for over half of the sugar produced on the
island and about 700;0 of the land planted in caneo
The fact that these four corporations were operating in direct
violation of a law of Congress did not seem to perturb the many law-
abiding United States residents who owned over 800;0 of their cor.
porate stock. On May 1, 1900, Congress had passed a Joint Resolu-
tion which supplemented the Organic Act of Puerto Rico and
provided that "every corporation hereafter authorized to engage in
agriculture shall by its charter be restricted to the ownership and
control of not to exceed 500 acres of land.' In various debates over
proposed changes in the Organic Act of Puerto Rico up to 1917 this
law withstood modification and was expressly reaffirmed on several
occasíons/"
Sorne feeble attempts were made to carry out a limited land re-
form program in 1915 when the insular government set up a Home-
stead Commission. Half a million dollars, raised by the sale of bonds
were used co buy land upon which small farmers were to be located.
Because of the prohibitive price of coastal sugar land, sorne 24,000
acres were bought in the mountainous interior of the island and di-
vided into about 20000 farms of 4, 16, or 20 acres depending upon
the fertility of the soil: In one project, El Duque, 800 families were
settled on land which cost $3°,000.21 Evaluating the work of che
Commission fourteen years later, the contributors to the Brookings
Institution study on Puerto Rico pessimistically noted that 120;0 of
the families relocated had forfeited their farms and 250;0 of the orig-
inal settlers had transferred their holdings to others. The majority
of the rest were behind in their payments to the Commission. Obvi-
ously, poor land had made poor farmers."
No serious attempts were undertaken to break up the monopoly
of fertile sugar land by enforcing the 500-acre limitation and return.
ing the land to those who tilled it until the decade of the great de-
pression and the New Deal of Franklin Roosevelt. Contrary to the
New Deal on the mainland, the economic reform for Puerto Rico
was to have followed a definite and deliberate plan drawn up, with
the advice and counsel of planners like Rexford Guy Tugwell, by
20 Gilberto Concepción de Gracia, "The Land Authority of Puerto Rico", T he
. George Washington Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 303-306.
21 Theodore Roosevelt, "Land Problems in Puerto Rico and the Philippine Islands,"
The Geograpbical Review (April, 1934), p. 182.
22 Víctor Clark et al, Porto Rico and its Problems (Washington: 1930), p. 370.
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three outstanding island intellectuals: Carlos Chardón, Chancellor
of the University of Puerto Rico; Rafael Menéndez Ramos, Commis-
sioner of Agriculture and Commerce; and Rafael Fernández Gareía,
professor of the University of Puerto Rico. The Chardón Plan, as it
was popularly known, contained four basic objectives: 1) to reduce
chronic unemployment; 2) to break up land monopoly; 3) to reduce to
a reasonable minimum the outflow of money in the form of interest
and dividends to the mainland; and 4) to work for emancipation from
the evils of monoculture through a readjustment of the sugar in-·
dustry."
Rexford Guy Tugwel1 had suggested to President Roosevelt that
the sugar industry of Puerto Rico be socialized and "run... both
economical1y and for the benefit of Puerto Rico as a whole,
on somewhat the same lines as a col1ective farm in the U. S. S. R."24
:While this confidential suggestion, expressed in bold terms, was
not followed, it was expeoted by government officials that the
objectives of the Chardón Plan would be realized through a govern-
ment or semi.public corporation which would acquire sugar land and
operate several sugar centrals as models or yardsticks to compete with
the private mills. Coupled with this development was the setting up
of quotas of sugar production and the limiting of sugar cane land to
the most productive. The colono would be induced to exchange,
at perhaps a three to one ratio, his marginal land for more fertile
cane land and he would also expect to participate in a greater share
of the profits from the govemment central. The marginal land se-
cured in this way would be sold 01) easy terms to smal1 farmers as
homestead or subsistence farms, Thus steps would be taken to break
up the latifundia of the sugar corporations, marginal sugar land
would be retired from production, government administered centrals
would serve as a brake on the common practice of exploitation of the
independent colono by the prívate central, and a fast multiplying re-
settlement program would reverse the migration of the landless to
the cities.
While the legal, administrative, and political obstacles to the
carrying out of this comprehensive economic revolution have been
studied in greater detail elsewhere," they may be briefly summarized
,23 Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Official File No. 400 Puerto Rico appoint-
rnents, Report from Chester Davis to Stephen Early, June 8, 1934.
24 National Archives, Record Group 126, Fred Bartlett's File, Memorandum for
Rexford Guv Tugwell on Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands tour of inspection, April
2, 1934. See also in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Dr. Tugwell's Repon on Amer-
kan Tropical Policy,
25 Thomas Mathews, Puerto Rican Politics and tbe New Dea! (Gainesville:
1960).
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as .follows: A government agency, the Puerto Rican Reconstruction
Administration, was substituted for the semi.public corporation, thus
hampering an independent financial operation based on a revolving
fund principIe; the $75 mi11ions deemed necessary to carry out the
plan were to have come from a federal processing tax on sugar, but
the Supreme Court blocked this source of funds and the agency was
limited to a mere $25 million; legal and financial reasons prevented
the colono farms, producing sugar on marginal lands, from being
exchanged for fertile sugar lands around the newly purchased gov-
ernment centrals; and fina11y, overwhelming local political opposi-
tion, some of which was accused by Seeretary of the Interior Harold
Ickes of being sugar dorninated," succeeded with the help of inept
administrators in isolating the federal program of economic reform
from any vestige of organized popular support.
Contrary to the prevalent opinion that nothing of importance oc-
curred previous to 1940, some very fruitful and positive results of
this first serious attempt at land reform can be pointed too For ex-
ample, there are the public services of one of the unsung heroes of the
land reform program of Puerto Rico. Benigno Fernández Garda,
the first Puerto Rican to be named Attorney General, labored against
great opposition in order to establish the legal basis for the enforce-
ment of the yoo.acre limitation against the absentee sugar carpora-
tions. The slow, tedious process initiated in 1936 was not successful
until 1942 when the second of two favorable pronouncements from
the Supreme Court finally halted any further efforts to violate the
law of the island.
On the other hand there is the negative lesson to be learned from
the failure of experiments which need not be repeated. For example
there is the failure of the laborers, eooperatives on the sugar lands of
the Lafayette central. The P.R.R.A. had purchased the Lafayette cen-
tral and the ten thousand acres of sugar land which it serviced. Un-
able 4:0 form colono cooperatives as originally planned, twelve land
eooperatives formed by the cane laborers were set up. Low yields,
lack of efficiency in operation, and heavy initial indebtedness pre-
vented the cooperatives from functioning as expected." Workers were
ill-prepared to appreciate the functioning of a complicated administra.
tive organization, from which, as collective owners, they expected to
receive immediate and not long-terrn benefits. Failure at Lafayette
26 National Archives, Division of Territories and Insular Possessions, 9-8-14 Oí-
fice of the Secretary, Letter from Secretary Ickes to Rafael Martínez Nadal and Bolívar
Pagán, January 16, 1936.
27 National Archives. Division of Territories and Insular Possessions, 9-8-107,
Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration General Report of the Lafayette investigat-
ing Committee to the Assistant Adminstrator, August 7, 1940.
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led to reacquisition of the land and its sale in small cultivatable plots
to independent colonos. But more important, it pointed the way tú
the organizing of profit-sharing farms."
Above all, the bold and sometimes disastrous experimentation
undertaken by those conneeted with this initial effort at land reform,
and the healthy public discussion which this provoked, prepareda
dimate of opinión which contributed directly to the success of a po-
litical party which took its stand for "pan, tierra y libertad" and,
once in power, independently launched an even broader program of
economic reformo
On April 12, 1941, the Land Authority was created by the gov-
ernment of Puerto Rico with the express purpose of breaking up the
latifundia and redistributing land through proportional-benefit farms,
resettling agregados or squatters, and setting up family farm units.
The proportional.benefit farms, 83 in number, often formed from the
colonias of the centrals, vary in size from 300 to 2,5°0 acres or larger,
depending upon the productive efficiency, and are turned over to ex-
perienced farmers or agronomists who administer the farm labor. The
total income of the administrator, who receíves a basic salary, fIuc-
tuates depending upon the net income of the sugar or pineapple pro-
duced. Similarly the worker is paid a wage and shares the profit in
proportion to labor done. At Central Cambalache, for example, the
Land Authority leased sorne 5,5°0 acres of proportional benefit farms
and converted sorne 2,000 acres into smalI family.size farms. From
1942 to 1956 the proportional-benefit farms distributed over five mil.
lion dollars among their workers in benefits over and aboye wages.
Sorne $1.5 million had been accumulated in reserve by the Land
Authority.
The program of the resettlement of agregados carried out by the
Land Authority and, after 1950, by che Social Programs Administra-
tion of the Department of Agriculture and Commerce has reinstalled
about 48,101 families on smalI (14 to 3 cuerdas) plots, located around
287 amply-serviced rural communities." Nearby many of these com.
munities the government has been successful in locating industrial
plants. Sorne unoffícial estimates indicate that there are still about
50,000 families which seek location under this programo
The third program set in motion by the 1941 land law had to
28 Sol 1. Descartes, "Land Reform in Puerto Ríco's Program of Economic Ad-
vancernent'Yin Family Farm Poltcy, ed. joseph Acherman and Marshall Harris TChicagó:
1947), p. 293.
29 Puerto Rico, Departamento de Agricultura y Comercio, Informe Anual, 1957-1958,
p. 56.
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do with setting up family farm units from 5 to 25 cuerdas, to be
bought over a period of 40 years by the farmer. As of October, 1959,
(he land Authority and later the Social Programs Administration have
located 1,053 families on small farms tota11ing over 15,000 acres of
land." The Federal Farm Security Administration in operation on the
island and the carry.over of the homestead program of the P.R.R.A.,
a11 now administered by the Social Programs Administration, have
located almost 3,000 additional families on sma11 family.size farms
mostly in the mountainous areas of the island.
When the Land Authority was established it was calculated that
there were some 194,500 acres held in excess of the yoo.acre limita-
tion. Up to 1952 the Land Authority had acquired several centrals
and about 95,502 acres of sugar land, most of which was divided up
ínto the 83 proportional-profit farms. In the past seven years little
or no effort has been made to expand the holding of the Land Au-
thority or to enforce further the yoo-acre law. An uncontested federal
injunction has stopped action against Luce and Company, the land-
holding affiliate of Central Aguirre. Prohibitive costs have been the
most commonly expressed reason for inaction. Studies by agricultur-
al experts'" of the proportional-profit farms have indicated that while
some have been able to turn out sizable profits year after year others,
particularly in the Fajardo and Loiza area, have piled up heavy losses.
In an effort to spread- the advantages of employment on the farms,
the Authority shared the work with double the number of laborers
that private industry would have used. Fina11y, while certain obvious
social benefits were forthcoming from the proportional.benefit farms,
the pessimistic conc1usion offered by the experts indicated that the
Authority "has had to assume many of the characteristics and pro-
blems of the very same corporate entities it was obliged to destroy.":"
The report conc1udes that any further efforts to enforce the yoo-acre
law and reduce the 100,000 acres still held in latifundia should be
through expansion in the number of family-size farms.
Asidefrom the two programs carried out by the Social Programs
Administration, no further steps toward a large.scale resettlement pro-
gram were taken until recently. One justification for the delay was
the time needed to study and prepare the way for the mechanization
of the agricultural phase of the produotion of sugar. With the way
apparently c1ear, Governor Luis Mufioz Marín went before the ísland
legislature on the 23rd of April, 1959, and called for a new direction
30 El Mundo, October 16. 1959.
31 Nathan Koening, A Comprebensioe Agricultural Program [or Puerto Rico
('Washington: 1953).
32 uu.. p. 258.
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in the government's land reform program." The request for legisla-
tion was couched in fairly general terms, but one clear message came
through: any new program would have to be justified in purely eco.
nomíc terms and make use of the most modern technological methods,
induding mechanization, and the most efficient adrninistrative organi.
zaJt1ons. To be fair it must be added that the governor urged that
any program should not neglect the rights of the workers involved.
Apparently, however, any future land reform will have to be judged
on its ability to pay its own way, and little recognition will be ex-
tended to the social benefits to be secured from an agrarian reformo
Many years ago, in a Ietter to Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, Muñoz
Marín outlined some of the ideals of the young men of his genera·
tion. He wrote of the hope "to fight hunger not with doles but with
social justice, operating within an economy that shall be as far as
possible planned and autonomous. .. to break through the strangle.
hold of land monopoly and restore the soil to the people that work
it.":" Great progress in the realization of these aims has been achieved
by this same generation which rose to political power in Puerto Rico,
but the task has not been finished completely. ' .
A new type of struggle has been taking place in contemporary
Puerto Rico. The coming generation which is impatient to occupY
positions of power shows little concern or ability to understand, much
less be guided by, the spiritual values in say Edwin Markham's poem
The Man with the Roe} even if in Spanish translation." Statistics
of profit or efficiency seem to be the only operational determinants of
the momento It is strange if not verging on hypocrisy for a govern-
ment which has endeavored to stimulate appreciation for deeper cul-
tural values in the minds of its people to defend every major economic
policy-not to mention political- in the terms of what it will mean
in dollars and cents.
Is there still a bold and adventurous spirit of experimental plan.
ning which would allow the island to continue its land reform pro-
gram on a greater scale than hitherto considered? There are signs
which seern to indicate otherwise. The Association of Sugar Produc-
ers several days previous to the above-mentioned message of the
governor publidy requested that experienced and proven colonos be
given first priority in the purchase of any land to be sold either by the
government or the large sugar corporations. In a recent report, circu.
33 El Mundo, April 24, 1959.
34 Ruhy Black Collection, University of Puerta Rico Library, Luis Muñoz Marín
to .I\11's. Roosevelt, Decernber 8. 1933.
35 Angel M. Torregrosa, ·Biogra/fa de Muñoz Marfil (San' Juan: 1944), Chapo
ter IX.
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lated among sorne of the faculty of the University of Puerto Rko,36
on the potential development of the sugar cane industry of Puerto
Rico it was suggested that the same technique which has preved so
successful in stimulating private industry on the island be used to stim-
ulate private initiative in the field of sugar production. The report
goes on to point out the abso1ute need for a complete rejuvenation
of the sugar industry through mechanization and u1traefficient pro·
duction methods. The cost of such a program is conservatively esti,
mated at $100,000,000. If it is successfu1, O'Connor predicts, the is.
land shou1d produce 1,842,000 tons of sugar in 1980.
The sugar producers, the government and the people of Puerto
Rico must decide the next steps to be taken. Latifundias still exist;
the scarce and possib1y exhausted sugar 1and needs the best technical
treatment; the agricultura1 process must be mechanized; and a very
1arge investment of government funds seerns inevitable. The legisla.
ture, looking for ways to implement the governor's request for action,
shou1d reject both the Koening and theO'Connor solution. To pro·
duce sugar on a family-size farm is to return to the ear1y nineteenth
centurywithout recognizing the realities of the heavily capita1ized
modero farm units. In Cuba, where mechanization has moved ahead
in recent years, the farm machine operator has not been paid the
higher wages to be expected on the basis of his specialized work.
Private colonos, burdened by heavy capital investment, could hardly
be expected nort to economize by paying low wages even to the semi-
skilled machine worker.
The large capital investment urged on the government by O'Con.
nor is subject to even further doubt. Enough government money has
been used in building expensive irrigation projects which eventually
benefit the sugar industry. Recent years have also seen the insular
government following the same questionable po1icy initiated by the
federal government of subsidizing sugar production. Any further gov-
ernment investment in &ugar shou1d be directed to public enterprises
which shou1d not be sole1y judged on their ability to turn out profit.
If the pub1ic through its government agencies is to finance the mod-
ernization of the sugar production then it is on1y modern-style social
justice that requires the public to benefit rather than a select few of
the rural élite. Large comp1ete1y mechanized farm units should be
administered and worked by technically trained new members of Puer-
to Rico's professional working c1ass. These technicians need not live
in rural communities since the is1and is small and already marked1y
se Donald J. O'Connor, The Deoelopment Potential 01 the Sugar Industl'Y of Puer-
to Rico; ]une 25, 1959.
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urbanized. No important sugar land is located more than an hour's
travel from large towns like Humacao, San Germán, 01' Arecibo. Cost.
ly community servicesneed not be constructed in isolated areas to
service these new technical workers who will find much in common
with their fellow industrial worker.
The Puerto Rican sugar industry seems to be in the same position
as the British coal industry after World War n. Serious considera-
tion should be extended to the possible nationalization of the industry.
Now that the days of high profit are gone, this proposal will not pro-
voke the same explosión as when Rexford Tugwell suggested itsome
rwenty.five years ago.
4
"Hablar de la Reforma Agraria es hablar de la Revolución."-
Fidel Castro.
, Cuba's constitution of 1940 contained an agrarian reform provi-
sion which was never put into effect by .the .governments which fol-
lowed. The provisión stipulated that all expropiated land would be
paid forin cash. To quote a critical editorial of Tbe Neto York Times
(June 30, 1959): "Everyone concedes that a landreform was over-
due." But the writer did not add that it took the revolution to bring
it about. The revolutionary government operating in Sierra Maestra
had decreed an Agrarian Reform Law on October 10, 1958, for che
area then controlled by the forces of the zéth of july movement.
Once in complete control of Cuba, the government proclaimed the
Agrarian Reform Law on May 17, 1959. .
The Law created the National Institute of the Agrarian Reform
(INRA) which, with the close cooperation of the revolutionaryarmy,
has rapidly converted itself into one of the most powerful and ím.
portant agencies of the Castro government. Originally there wére
sorne seven Departments in the National Institute, but this number
has grown to thirteen and more as the increasing work has demanded.
Cuba has been divided into 27 zones (originaHy there were to be a
symbolic 26 but a human factor frustrated (he neat design) and each
zone has an organization, similar to the National Institute, admin.
istered by a delegado. .
During the first three months the INRA distributed a questíon-
naire to thousands of .landowners and corporations and another one
to the hundreds of thousands of guajiros 01' small farmers who hope
to acquire ,01' toexpand .!Mral holdings through .the .agrarian reform.
On the basis of (he informafiori secured, the prógnim of ari effective
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social revolution was to get underway. The law decrees that, with the
exception of land fully exploited in the production of sugar cane,
rice, or cattle, those owners of farms of more than 30 caballerías, or
any person or corporation with more than this amount in several small
farms, must forfeit the excess. Fully exploited cattle, sugar, or rice
farms may retain up to 100 caballerías (3,33° acres).
Just as in Puerto Rico, but certainly not in imitation of the Puer-
to Rican program, the Cuban reform was moving in three directíons.
Those who owned small farms were eligible to increase their holdings
up to 30 caballerías (about 1,000 acres). Large units of expropriated
land were not necessarily to be broken up if preservation of the unit
would enable large-scale exploítation of the soil. These uníts would
be worked by cooperative cornmunities under the management and
direotion of trained INRA personnel. Finally, the Agrarian Reform
has decreed that all agricultural laborers have a right to own a "vital
mínimum" of land which fluctuares between two to five caballerías
(67 to 500 acres) depending upon the fertility of the soil and the
land available.
The Revolution allowed Cuba to bypass the long years consumed
in the legal battle by which the latifundistas of Puerto Rico hoped to
sidetrack the land reform proposals of the Chardón Plan and later
the Popular Party, Nor has the Cuban agrarian reform gotten bogged
down in the time-consuming paper work which is absolutely necessary
if a thorough social revolution is eventually to be realized. As more
.than one Cuban has pointed out, the youthful leaders of the new Cuba
are moving with lightening swiftness uncharacteristic of the stereo-
type ímpression of the tropical Latín held by the neighbors to the
north. The ever-present fear that something will prevent the comple.
tion of the land reform (d. Puerto Rico since 1950) has motivated
che administrators of the INRA to make daring promises and launch
out on even more daring experiments. The INRA has predicted
that by the end of the year 100,000 farmers will be tilling land which
is newly theirs." Already cooperatíve communal farms are producing
rice, tomatoes and potatoes. Castro ha predicted an eventual sugar
production of 8 million tons. The adrninistrator of the INRA, a re-
cognized speleologist, has not overlooked the contribution which the
rich fertilizer found in Cuba' s extensive limestone caves can make
to the agrarian reformo
The INRA, by order of the Castro government, received over
$100,000,000 dollars in cash and property which was confiscated from
37 Interview with Waldo Medina, Director of the Lega! División of the INRA:
]uly 17, 1959.
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the deposit boxes and holding of the members of the Batista govern-
mento A partial breakdown of this amount shows $20 million in bank
deposíts of which three and a half million were in the name of Ba-
tista. Another $17.5 million was recovered when the Govemment
dec1ared null and void all paper dollars of the $1,000 and $500
categories. Eight thousand caballerías of farm lands valued at over
$19 million dollars were occupied with sorne 38,000 head of cattle.
Two sugar centrals were also -turned over to the INRA.38 If in the
first year productive results are forthcoming from this confiscated
land and capital, then Cuba may move on to the harder task of break-
ing up the land of the non-political latifundistas.
All of the contagious and absolutely essential elements of enthu.
siasm connected with the march of the land reform will not prevent
inefficiency, rnistakes, and economic set-backs. At this early date ít
would be grossly unfair to attempt to assess the chances of success
of the Cuba land reform programo Cuban governments have rarely
undertaken to prepare a groupof non.polítícal public servants trained
in the adrninistration of the state. Sadly lacking and apparent in
every office visited was the need for a serious-minded, efficient ad-
ministrator. Unfortunately the popular fervor with which Fidel Cas-
tro insists upon goveming his Cuba has not allowed the development
of an environment which would foster the needed expression of cons-
tructive public criticismo Such criticism would prevent the continua-
tion of stumbling blocks to the point where only a small explosion
can remove them, For example, in August, 1959, the wáter was
informed in a conversation with an agronomist, born in Maricao,
Puerto Rico, and now working under the Point IV program of the
United States government in Cuba, of the obvious disorganization of
the agrarian reform program being carried out in the Camagüey
area. Several months passed before anything happened; at the end
of October, 1959, Hubert Matos, delegado of the INRA in Cama-
güey was removed summarily by Fidel Castro, thrown in prison and
charged with blocking the agrarian reformo .
In Cuba there reigns an excess of enthusiasm for the agradan
reform and its plans for a new order for the landless. In Puerto Rico
there is excessive insistence that any further agrarian reform be judged
only on its ability to pay its own way. Obviously each island could
stand to benefit from the other. An exchange of ideas, plans, and
past experience might mean the difference between failure and suc-
cess for the agrarian reform in both places.
88 La Revolución, ]uIy 28, 1959.
